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Casenate
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SODOMY STATUTES: THE
QUESTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY. Buchanan v. Batchelor,
308 F. Supp. 729 (N.D. Tex. 1970).
I. INTRODUCTION
Although the winds of change have created some ripples,: the
ancient crime of sodomy remains on the books in Nebraska and
forty-six other states2 despite repeated attacks by commentators3
and renunciation by the Model Penal Code.4 Reinforced by Scrip-
ture5 and public sensibilities, sodomy statutes resisted constitu-
tional attack until 1969, when the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Texas in the case of Buchanan v. Batchelor"
found the Texas sodomy statute, essentially similar to those of al-
most all other jurisdictions, unconstitutional, and enjoined its en-
forcement.
Most sodomy statutes have been interpreted to cover all "un-
natural" sexual relations between persons of the same or different
sex, or between man and beast. Because of the nature of the acts
involved, there has been reluctance to require detailed description
in the statutes. Although the tendency has been to shed these in-
1 Six states, Connecticut, Kansas, Illinois, New York, Minnesota, and
Utah, have recently repealed or significantly modified their sodomy
statutes.
2 Connecticut, Kansas, and Minnesota do not punish sodomy.
3 Cantor, Deviation and the Criminal Law, 55 3. CmM. L.C. & P.S. 441
(1964); Note, Criminal Law-Consensual Homosexual Behavior-The
Need for Legislative Reform, 57 KY. L. 3. 591 (1969); Note, Criminal
Law-Sexual Offenses-Sodom'y-Cunnilingus, 8 NAT. RESOURCES J.
531 (1968); Note, Sodomy Statutes-A Need for Change, 13 S.D.L.
Rnv. 384 (1968); Note, Crimes Against Nature, 16 J. PuB. L. 159 (1967);
Note, Deviate Sexual Behavior: The Desirability of Legislative Pro-
scription, 30 ALBANY L. REv. 291 (1966); Note, Sex Laws in Ohio: A
Need for Revision, 35 U. CiN. L. REv. 211 (1966).
4 The Model Penal Code prohibits deviate sexual intercourse only where
it is accomplished through force, involves adult corruption of minors,
or is accompanied by a public offense. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1
(Prop. Off. Draft, 1962).
5 Livircus 18: 22-23; LEvITicus 20: 13; DEuTE o oy 23: 17.
6 308 F. Supp. 729 (N.D. Tex. 1970).
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hibitions in favor or more explicit wording, twenty-six states7 still
follow the example of the original English sodomy statute of 1533,8
which describes the prohibited acts only as "the detestable and
abominable vice of buggery, committed with either man or beast."
Such wording plainly leaves much to judicial construction. Thus
the most common constitutional attack on such sodomy statutes
has been their vagueness. No sodomy statute has fallen to such an
attack.9 State courts, although inconsistent among themselves in
their interpretation of similar statutes, 10 have uniformly held that
the statute sufficiently defines the offense, usually relying on the
common law or on past decisions.1
Another line of constitutional attack, adopted by many commen-
tators, is that sodomy statutes violate individual privacy to an ex-
tent unwarranted by legitimate state interest. State courts gener-
ally reject these attacks on the grounds that sodomy regulation is
a proper legislative function.
12
The Nebraska Supreme Court has had little opportunity to
construe the Nebraska sodomy statute,13 as only five sodomy prose-
cutions have reached that court, the last being in 1948.14 In none of
7 Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Delaware, Florida,
Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
South Dakota, and Tennessee.
8 25 Hen. 8, c. 6 (1533).
9 In Harris v. State, 457 P.2d 638 (Alas. 1969), the phrase "the crime
against nature" as used in the Alaska sodomy statute (ALAsKA STAT.
§ 11.40.120 (1962)) was declared void for vagueness. However, the
statute included the word "sodomy" which was held not unconstitu-
tionally vague, thus saving the constitutionality of the statute.
10 See Harris v. State, 457 P.2d 638 (Alas. 1969).
-11 E.g., State v. White, 217 A.2d 221 (Me. 1966). In Perkins v. North
Carolina, 234 F. Supp. 333 (W.D.N.C. 1964), it was said that on its
face the North Carolina sodomy statute (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-177
(1969)) was unconstitutionally vague, but that past decisions of the
state courts prevented a holding of unconstitutionality.
1 People v. Ragsdale, 177 Cal. App. 2d 676, 2 Cal. Rptr. 640 (1960);
People v. Rhinehart, 70 Wash. 2d 649, 424 P.2d 906, cert. denied, 389
U.S. 832 (1967).
1 NEB. Rzv. STAT. § 28-919 (Reissue 1964): "Whoever has carnal copu-
lation with a beast, or in an opening of the body except sexual parts
with another human being, shall be guilty of sodomy, and shall be
imprisoned in the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex not
more than twenty years."
14 Redmon v. State, 150 Neb. 62, 33 N.W.2d 349 (1948); Sledge v. State,
142 Neb. 350, 6 N.W.2d 76 (1942); Clark v. State, 114 Neb. 818, 211
N.W. 16 (1926); Abbott v. State, 113 Neb. 517, 204 N.W. 74 (1925);
Kinnan v. State, 86 Neb. 234, 125 N.W. 594 (1910).
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these decisions were constitutional objections to the statute dis-
cussed. The court referred obliquely to the propriety of such legis-
lation in Kinnan v. State.15 There the original Nebraska sodomy
statute,16 very similar to the English statute of 1533, was held to
exclude acts of fellatio, and a conviction based on such acts was
reversed. Having reached its decision, the court commented: "It
is to be regretted that acts so infamous and disgusting have not
been declared to be a felony by the legislature of this state, and we
trust that the lawmakers will speedily remedy this defect."'17
II. THE PRELUDE TO BUCHANAN
The fountainhead from which the Buchanan decision eventually
sprung was the well-known case of Griswold v. Connecticut.8 In
that case a Connecticut statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives
was held unconstitutional. The opinion of the court, written by
Mr. Justice Douglas and joined by three others, held that the First
Amendment "has a penumbra where privacy is protected from
governmental intrusion,"' 9 and concluded that the marriage rela-
tionship is within this penumbra, making marital privacy a con-
stitutional right.
Griswold, with its seeming recognition of a constitutional right
of privacy, was quickly seized upon as a weapon against sodomy
statutes. Attacks based upon Griswold were generally rejected,
the courts restricting Griswold's application to marital privacy, and
holding unmarried defendants to be without standing to raise a
constitutional attack.
20
In Cotner v. Henry,2 ' however, there clearly was no standing
problem, for the conviction was based on the accusations of the de-
fendant's wife. The Seventh Circuit was apparently the first court
to consider Griswold's effect on sodomy statutes, and found in favor
's 86 Neb. 234, 125 N.W. 594 (1910).
16 Law of February 25, 1875, p.26, § 1, [18751 Nebr. Laws 1875 (repealed
1913): "That the infamous crime against nature, either with man or
beast, shall subject the offender to be punished by imprisonment in
the penitentiary for a term not less than one year and my [may] ex-
tend to life."
17 86 Neb. at 237, 125 N.W. at 595. In 1913 the legislature enacted what
is, except for a minor change, the present Nebraska sodomy statute,
which covers acts of fellatio. See Sledge v. State, 142 Neb. 350, 6
N.W.2d 76 (1942).
Is 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
'9 Id. at 483.
20 Harris v. State, 457 P.2d 638 (Alas. 1969); Jones v. State, 85 Nev. 411,
456 P.2d 429 (1969).
21 394 F.2d 873 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 847 (1968).
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of the defendant: "The import of the Griswold decision is that
private, consensual marital relations are protected from regulation
by the state through the use of a criminal penalty. '22 Therefore the
Indiana statute under which Cotner was convicted could not be
constitutionally interpreted as making private consensual physical
relations between married persons a crime in the absence of a
showing of state interest in preventing such relationships. The
court opined, however, that the statute could be construed by the
Indiana courts as being inapplicable to married couples or as pro-
hibiting acts of sodomy between married couples only when ac-
companied by force.2 The court then reversed the conviction be-
cause Cotner had been allowed to waive his right to a trial and
plead guilty without understanding the necessary elements of the
charge against him, that is, that an allegation of force was neces-
sary and consent of the spouse was a defense to the charge.
III. THE BUCHANAN DECISION
Alvin L. Buchanan, a confessed homosexual, had twice been ar-
rested and charged with sodomy under Article 524 of the Texas
Penal Code, which provides:
Whoever has carnal copulation with a beast, or in an opening of
the body except sexual parts, with another human being, or who-
ever shall use his mouth on the sexual parts of another human
being for the purpose of having carnal copulation or who shall
voluntarily permit the use of his own sexual parts in a lewd or
lascivious manner by any minor, shall be guilty of sodomy, and
upon conviction thereof shall be confined in the penitentiary not
less than two (2) nor more than fifteen (15) years.
Buchanan requested the designation of a three-judge court to
consider his prayers for, inter alia, a declaratory judgment on the
constitutionality of the statute. The court was of the opinion that
there was serious question as to whether Buchanan alone had stand-
ing to raise the issue upon which the case eventually turned, the
constitutional rights of married couples. Unusual developments,
however, eliminated the standing problem. Michael Gibson and his
wife Janet were granted leave to intervene, alleging that Buchanan
22 394 F.2d at 875.
23 hinD. ANN. STAT. § 10-4221 (1956): "Whoever commits the abominable
and detestable crime against nature with mankind or beast; or who-
ever entices, allures, instigates, or aids any person under the age of
twenty-one (21) years of age to commit masturbation or self-pollu-
tion, shall be deemed guilty of sodomy, and on conviction shall be
fined not less than one hundred dollars ($100) nor more than one
thousand dollars ($1000) to which may be added imprisonment in the
state prison not less than two years (2) nor more than fourteen (14)
years."
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did not sufficiently protect the interest of married persons fearing
prosecution for private acts of sodomy. Similarly, Travis Strickland
was granted leave to intervene, alleging that Buchanan did not pro-
tect the interest of homosexuals who fear prosecution for acts of
sodomy committed in private.
The court first rejected the contention that it should abstain from
ruling on the constitutionality of the statute until the Texas courts
had an opportunity to do so. The first of its two reasons for refusing
to abstain was the lack of availability of a state forum where the
issues would be litigated; for this proposition the court cited Dom-
browski v. Pfister2 and Zwickler v. Koota.
25
The court's second reason for rejecting the abstention argument
was that "there exists in Article 524 no question of statutory inter-
pretation for which the courts of this State would be of assistance
in resolving."26 The court noted that Article 524 did not distinguish
between acts committed in public or in private, homosexual or
heterosexual acts, by married or unmarried persons. "Indeed it
plainly appears that Article 524 applies to private consensual acts
between married persons and private acts of sodomy between
homosexuals.
27
It will be noted at this point that the Buchanan court went a
significant step beyond Cotner. That decision, dealing with a statute
which drew none of the distinctions which were lacking in Article
524, provided that the Indiana courts could construe the statute as
being applicable to married couples in the absence of a showing of
force, and thus declined to hold it unconstitutional.
The Buchanan court also rejected a challenge to the standing
of the Gibsons to raise the constitutional rights of married persons.
The state pointed out that no married couples had been charged
with sodomy under Article 524, and thus the Gibsons had no real
fear of future prosecution. As supporting authority, Poe v. Ullman2 8
was relied upon. In Poe the plaintiffs sued for a declaratory judg-
ment that certain Connecticut statutes prohibiting the use of con-
traceptive devices and the giving of advice in their use were un-
24 380 U.S. 479 (1965). The Dombrowski court held that the absention
doctrine is inappropriate where a statute is justifiably attacked on
its face as abridging free expression.
25 389 U.S. 241 (1967). In Zwickler, the Court held that to require the
plaintiff who has commenced proceedings in federal court to await the
determination of a state court action might chill exercise of the very
constitutional right he seeks to enforce.
26 308 F. Supp. at 731.
27 Id.
28 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
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constitutional. These statutes had been in existence since 1879 but
there had never been a bona fide prosecution under them.29 The
Supreme Court dismissed, holding there was no real controversy.
The Buchanan court distinguished Poe by noting that from 1963
through July 3, 1969, there had been 451 arrests under Article 524
in the city of Dallas alone. From this the court concluded:
While the record does not reveal any arrests of married persons
the statute is definitely being enforced and since the Gibsons have
admitted being in violation there is a real threat of prosecution
from a District Attorney who takes pride in the manner in which
he has enforced the law.3 0
The Buchanan court further noted that Dombrowski, decided
four years subsequent to Poe, "clearly holds that where an over-
broad statute is on the books there is a 'threat of prosecution.' If
Dombrowski does not overrule Poe, it appears that Poe should be
strictly construed to limit its effect to the peculiar circumstances
of that case."
'31
The Buchanan opinion devotes considerably less space to the
merits than to matters of standing and justiciability. The state's
right to regulate sexual promiscuity or misconduct was recognized,
with sodomy being particularly mentioned. However, it was em-
phasized that such regulation "may not be achieved by means
which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area
of protected freedoms."32 Although sodomy was "probably offen-
sive to the vast majority, 3 3 that was not sufficient reason for the
State to interfere with the physical relationships of married couples.
"In conclusion, Article 524 is void on its face for unconstitutional
overbreadth insofar as it reaches the private, consensual acts of
married couples.
'3 4
29 A test case to determine the constitutionality of the statutes was
brought in 1940. State v. Nelson, 126 Conn. 412, 11 A.2d 856 (1940).
After the supreme court of errors held the statutes constitutional, the
informations against the defendants were dismissed.
30 308 F. Supp. at 735.
31 Id.
32 308 F. Supp. at 733 (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
485 (1965); Griswold in turn quoted NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S.
288, 307 (1964)).
33 308 F. Supp. at 733.
34 Id. at 735.
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IV. IMPLICATIONS OF BUCHANAN
Only two states, New York 35 and Illinois,36 have sodomy statutes
which are inapplicable to married couples. Thus all other sodomy
statutes are vulnerable to attacks based on Buchanan. Yet it would
not appear that a wholesale judicial nullification of sodomy statutes
is in the offing. The Buchanan court appeared willing to continue
the practice of allowing only married persons to raise the rights of
married persons. Therefore, the only cases in which a sodomy sta-
tute could be declared unconstitutional under Buchanan would be
one in which a truculent spouse accuses his mate, as in Cotner, or
where an interested married couple is allowed to intervene, as in
Buchanan.
It is noteworthy that the Buchanan court did not discuss the
claims of Mr. Strickland, the intervener on behalf of homosexuals
who "do their thing" in private. A clue to the court's thoughts
about Strickland's arguments may be gleaned from the fact that
in discussing "cases citing Griswold which have some significance
in the interpretation of Article 524,"37 the court noted Travers v.
Paton,s which held that Griswold was only applicable to protect
the sexual relations of married couples. At any rate, the court's
ruling that Article 524 is unconstitutionally broad because it reached
the private acts of married couples would seem to suggest that
homosexual acts, and heterosexual acts between unmarried couples,
whether committed in public or in private, are proper subjects of
prosecution under sodomy statutes.
In thus restricting its interpretation of Griswold, the Buchanan
court followed in the footsteps of numerous other courts which have
applied Griswold, insofar as sexual relations are concerned, to mar-
ried couples only.3 9 This position is strongly indicated by the ma-
35 In New York, "deviate sexual intercourse" within the meaning of
the Penal Code applies only to persons not married to each other. See
N.Y. PENAL LAw § 130.00 (McKinney 1967). For comment on the New
York law, see Plesgrove, Sex Offenses Under the New Penal Law, 32
BnooK. L. REv. 274 (1966).
86 ILL. AiN. STAT. ch. 38, art. 11 (Smith-Hurd 1964). The committee
comments to article II state: "The Article is not intended to proscribe
any sexual conduct between consenting adults unless such conduct
adversely affects one of the key interests sought to be protected." For
comment on the Illinois law, see Wexler, Sex Offenses Under the New
Criminal Code, 51 ILL. B.J. 152 (1962); Note, Deviate Sexual Be-
havior Under the New Illinois Criminal Code, 1965 WAsH. U.L.Q. 220.
87 308 F. Supp. at 732.
39 261 F. Supp. 110 (D.C. Conn. 1966).
39 In Sturgis v. Attorney General, -Mass.-, 260 N.E.2d 687, 690 (1970),
it was held that Griswold "affirmed 'beyond doubt' the right of the
state ... to enact statutes regulating the private sexual lives of single
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jority opinions in the Griswold decision. Justice Douglas, writing
the opinion of the court, was careful to confine the ground for de-
cision to the right of marital privacy. Justice Goldberg, joined by
Justice Brennan and Chief Justice Warren in a concurring opinion,
concluded by pointing out that this decision "in no way interferes
with a State's proper regulation of sexual promiscuity or miscon-
duct. '40 Justice White noted in his opinion that "the State's policy
against all forms of promiscuity or illicit sexual relationships, be
they premarital or extramarital," is "concededly a permissible and
legitimate legislative goal."' Justice Harlan adopted his dissenting
opinion in Poe v. Ullman in which he said:
[T]o attempt a line between public behavior and that which is
purely consensual or solitary would be to withdraw from com-
munity concern a range of subjects with which every society in
civilized times has found it necessary to deal. The laws regarding
marriage which provide both when the sexual powers may be used
and the legal and societal context in which children are born
and brought up, as well as laws forbidding adultery, fornication
and homosexual practices which express the negative of the propo-
sition, confining sexuality to lawful marriage, form a pattern so
deeply pressed into the substance of our social life that any Con-
stitutional doctrine in this area must build upon that basis. 42
Obviously the "right of privacy" which the Court found implied in
the Constitution cannot be without limitation, and it seems clear
that the Court believed that the right to privacy in sexual matters
did not extend beyond the marriage relation. Thus, no direct auth-
ority is present in Griswold for a holding that unmarried couples,
be they homosexual or heterosexual, are free to do as they please
without regard to statutory regulation.
The state of the law after Buchanan, while an improvement
over past law, remains unsatisfactory. The impact of the decision
is to extend governmental protection to various physical activities
when carried out by members of one class, married couples, while
denying this protection to those who are not of that class. The easy
justification for this discrimination has always been the govern-
ment's interest in protecting the marriage relationship, "the found-
ation of the family and of society, without which there would be
persons .... ." See also Smayda v. United States, 352 F.2d 251 (9th
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 981 (1966); Travers v. Paton, 261 F.
Supp. 110 (D.C. Conn. 1966); People v. Hurd, 5 Cal. App. 3d 865, 85
CaL Rptr. 718 (1970); People v. Frazier, 256 Cal. App. 2d 631, 64 Cal.
Rptr. 447 (1968); People v. Roberts, 256 Cal. App. 2d 488, 64 Cal. Rptr.
70 (1967); Jones v. State, 85 Nev. 411, 456 P.2d 429 (1969).
40 381 U.S. at 498-99.
41 Id. at 505.
42 367 U.S. at 546.
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neither civilization nor progress."43 In the light of contemporary
questioning as to whether the traditional man-woman relationship
really does or should occupy this exalted status in our society, it
is highly questionable whether membership in the class of married
persons is a proper basis for discrimination under the criminal law.
However, Buchanan provides a tool with which to attack sodomy
statutes, one aspect of this discrimination. Married couples could
intervene in other actions as the Gibsons did in Buchanan, and,
with the Buchanan decision as precedent, the chances of having al-
most any sodomy statute declared unconstitutional would appear
to be good. The specter of this happening may motivate state legis-
latures to remodel their sodomy statutes to conform to constitutional
requirements. If in the process there is some thoughtful considera-
tion of the proper relationship of sex and the criminal law, the ef-
fect of Buchanan will be one for which future generations can be
grateful.
John F. Simmons '72
43 Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888).
44 See TimE, Dec. 28, 1970, at 34.
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